The Northern War

Heke had been a supporter of the Treaty. Much has been made of the fact that he was the first chief to sign the agreement. I’ve always assumed the figure in the most well known images (see Treaty or Bust below) depict Heke in the act of signing.

Heke it seemed viewed the treaty as an agreement between him and the crown over control over “their” Pakeha. He was disappointed and felt his mana was diminished by decisions made by Hobson. The imposition of custom duties including a 30% tax on muskets reduced their trade. Speculators followed Hobson to Auckland, moving the capital also reduced his mana took away future trading opportunities.

By 1844 he felt aggrieved enough to attack the symbols that on a daily basis reminded him of his loss. Attacking these symbols would show the Administration his anger and show his Iwi that he still needed to be respected

Hekes War was not universally supported within Nga Puhi. We have already talked about how the Iwi were split into competing Hapu The Hokianga hapu had always harboured a lingering jealousy over the riches their bay of Islands relatives monopolised. In 1844 these hapu were prepared to go to war to support Britain.

Belich makes the point that the Maori combatants on both sides in this war were fighting to retain their Pakeha not to drive them away.

The Northern War is characterised by what we might consider to be the low level nature of much of the fighting. Kororarekas sacking seems to have been an accident or over enthusiasm. Later fighting especially between Maori saw prisoners exchanged at the end of each days fighting. When the British were involved it seems to have been more serious. Puketutu seems to have seen Kawiti and Heke testing the Britisn tactics and weapons. Ohaewai saw the unleashing of tactics designed to maximise Maori weapons by weakening British firepower.

The only battle that was lost by Heke was one which did not even include the British. When Imperial troops were involved they characteristically failed to make any impression. Kawitis description of Despard as a ‘very stupid person’ seems particularly apt. Reliance on the 19^th century version of ‘shock and awe’ frontal assaults into prepared positions meant death to troops who were poorly led.

Battles atPuketutu andOhaewai were effective draws, although a British regiment could never admit as much. They claimed to have inflicted high casualty rates, which the Maori masked by taking their dead and wounded with them. They claimed victories because they occupied Pa sites. Belich notes that these sites were military and economic nullities – empty vessels that had drawn the British into killing fields.

Grey arrived in time for Ruapekapeka, a mixed bag of victories and losses for both sides. Kawiti was unable to spring the trap he had hoped for. Grey had not won a battle nor had he had killed, wounded or captured the ‘rebels’.

The war now drifted to a close. Britain claimed overall victory but surprisingly inflicted now penalties upon the losers. Despite Heke’s best efforts economic wealth would now drift southward and so would the conflict.

The one new innovation of the war was Kawitis development of the Modern pa. No longer the ‘gunfighter’ pa of the Musket Wars, but a new easily constructed (and abandoned) masterpiece of wood and earth that could withstand almost anything the British army could throw at it. These ‘curiously hollowed out’ trench and bunker systems would confound and confuse the British for another 20 years