Wednesday 25 May 2011

The Waikato Campaign.

Greys intention was always to destroy the base of the King. That meant advancing into the Waikato and attacking him in his Turangawaiwai. His motives were simple. Remove the King and he would remove the one obstacle to establishing (his) hegemony over the country. Colonial Administrators wanted more. Much, much, more.

Russell and Whitaker dominated the Government but also had a personal reason for wanting to invade and confiscate Maori land.
Their small cabal of investors were envious of the Maori farms which supplied Auckland and the Australian colonies with produce.

They saw great potential if this land could be acquired cheaply (Confiscation is about as cheap as you can get) and then sold at a profit to the ever growing number of settlers arriving in the colony. Maori farms remained communally owned and the Waikato was the seat of the Kingite ‘Land League’ which stubbornly refused to become alienated from any more of its land.

The Settler Government acquired the £3m loan which paid for the arrival of the ‘Fencibles’, militia who would be paid for their service to the Government with grants of land in the confiscated areas, fulfilling two goals. This force meant the Settler government could show that they were playing their part in the war as well as providing a long term force capable of mobilisation at a moments notice (The NZ version of the Minute men?).

The invasion itself went slowly. General Cameron was a professional soldier who had a distinguished career, he was expected to crush the Kingites in short order. The Great South Road made it easy for him to shift men and supplies to the Waikato but not into it. Progress was slow and made even slower by Maori attacks on the fringes of Auckland. This necessitated leaving soldiers behind to protect both Auckland and the supply lines. It took three months to reach Meremere.In some respects Maori tactics had been to successful.

A force of 1500 warriors had erected the Meremere line and waited patiently for the British to arrive. But 3 months was to long and many had been forced to return home, leaving a force to small to defend the fortifications. After a brief fire-fight, which included Maori use of artillery, the defenders melted back into the forest and Cameron marched on.

To Rangiriri, which was again a massive set of fortifications (amongst the worlds largest according to Belich) which ran between the river and a Lake forcing the British to attack head on. Because they controlled the river they were able to land troops behind the line and attack from both sides. Despite this advantage the Maori held out, repulsing several attacks at least one of which reached the central redoubt before being pushed back.

The next morning under what the Maori claimed was a flag of truce, the British captured 180 Maori, the rump of the army that had initially been prepared to fight them – the rest had again disappeared. Not surprisingly within 18 months almost all of these prisoners had escaped.Cameron marched on.

He captured the empty Ngaruawahia, capital of the King. He then reached a third line of fortifications. This was the Paterangi line, even bigger than those at Rangiriri. Intelligence said this was defended by a far larger force than at the previous battle. If a few defenders could hold him back there what could a larger force in better prepared positions do? Cameron decided to repeat his tactics, and bypassed the line by landing at Rangiaowhia, a village the Maori believed to be neutral. Many old people and children were killed when the whare caught alight during the fighting here.
Afterwards when Cameron advanced on Paterangi he again found it abandoned. The King and most of his followers had again vanished travelling south into the fastness of the Maniapoto. He could go no further. His lines of communication were to long and he would have to leave the security of the river and venture into the forests of the interior.

He needed another way of proving his mettle.

Orakau
was an unfortunate accident for the Kingites. Newly arrived Ngati Porou & Tuhoe unhappy at missing out on previous battles chose to build a pa in a poorly positioned site.It was easily surrounded, had no escape route, and was incomplete. to make matters worse it had little food and no water. To compound matters they were surprised and had no chance to send their women away.

Much of what happened here has been idealised and used to mythologise the wars. Rewi has been depicted as brave ("friend I will fight for ever and ever") and the Maori as stoic ("The women and children are to die as well" ). Surrounded with little ammunition and no water it should have been a stunning victory.

That Cameron killed 80 odd Maori was some consolation but the escape of Rewi Maniapoto was a disappointment.

Cameron also realized that he had advanced as far as logistics would allow. The King ensconced with his Maniapoto kin was safe from Greys paddle ships and Cameron's lines of communication were now too long and difficult to defend.

Despondent Cameron then recieved news of a opportunity at Tauranga...

1 comment:

  1. AnonymousJune 07, 2011

    Hi Henry, I am researching NZ history for two novels I am planning to write. one based on my Maori ancestor --I have found her on the Maori census of that time and the other on my Grandfather in the late 1800's who vowed never to marry until he found his Mother's sister who had been taken in the Maori land wars near New Plymouth. he found her the soldiers had gone and retrieved her and she was brought up by a european family. The books will be loosely based on these events and I will need to do considerable research. I've noted down the books you recommend and will read your blog as well as a number of pioneer novels from around the world. If you have any ideas to help me in my quest I would be delighted to hear from you. Thanks Vickie vickieferns@hotmail.com

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