The Northern War

Heke had been a supporter of the Treaty. Much has been made of the fact that he was the first chief to sign the agreement. I’ve always assumed the figure in the most well known images (see Treaty or Bust below) depict Heke in the act of signing.

Heke it seemed viewed the treaty as an agreement between him and the crown over control over “their” Pakeha. He was disappointed and felt his mana was diminished by decisions made by Hobson. The imposition of custom duties including a 30% tax on muskets reduced their trade. Speculators followed Hobson to Auckland, moving the capital also reduced his mana took away future trading opportunities.

By 1844 he felt aggrieved enough to attack the symbols that on a daily basis reminded him of his loss. Attacking these symbols would show the Administration his anger and show his Iwi that he still needed to be respected

Hekes War was not universally supported within Nga Puhi. We have already talked about how the Iwi were split into competing Hapu The Hokianga hapu had always harboured a lingering jealousy over the riches their bay of Islands relatives monopolised. In 1844 these hapu were prepared to go to war to support Britain.

Belich makes the point that the Maori combatants on both sides in this war were fighting to retain their Pakeha not to drive them away.

The Northern War is characterised by what we might consider to be the low level nature of much of the fighting. Kororarekas sacking seems to have been an accident or over enthusiasm. Later fighting especially between Maori saw prisoners exchanged at the end of each days fighting. When the British were involved it seems to have been more serious. Puketutu seems to have seen Kawiti and Heke testing the Britisn tactics and weapons. Ohaewai saw the unleashing of tactics designed to maximise Maori weapons by weakening British firepower.

The only battle that was lost by Heke was one which did not even include the British. When Imperial troops were involved they characteristically failed to make any impression. Kawitis description of Despard as a ‘very stupid person’ seems particularly apt. Reliance on the 19^th century version of ‘shock and awe’ frontal assaults into prepared positions meant death to troops who were poorly led.

Battles atPuketutu andOhaewai were effective draws, although a British regiment could never admit as much. They claimed to have inflicted high casualty rates, which the Maori masked by taking their dead and wounded with them. They claimed victories because they occupied Pa sites. Belich notes that these sites were military and economic nullities – empty vessels that had drawn the British into killing fields.

Grey arrived in time for Ruapekapeka, a mixed bag of victories and losses for both sides. Kawiti was unable to spring the trap he had hoped for. Grey had not won a battle nor had he had killed, wounded or captured the ‘rebels’.

The war now drifted to a close. Britain claimed overall victory but surprisingly inflicted now penalties upon the losers. Despite Heke’s best efforts economic wealth would now drift southward and so would the conflict.

The one new innovation of the war was Kawitis development of the Modern pa. No longer the ‘gunfighter’ pa of the Musket Wars, but a new easily constructed (and abandoned) masterpiece of wood and earth that could withstand almost anything the British army could throw at it. These ‘curiously hollowed out’ trench and bunker systems would confound and confuse the British for another 20 years

A Challenge to the Empire

One of the chiefs at Waitangi shook hands with Hobson and commented that he was sick and would die soon. Hobson did in deed suffer a stroke and was effectively laid up for several months until he died.

He did manage to make some crucial decisions. He annexed the South Island by ‘right of discovery’ which conveniently allowed Britain to claim the South Island before the expected French settlers could and before his emissaries could drag copies down there.

We’ve discussed the fact that it may also have been easy to do because there were so few Ngai Tahu around to negotiate with. Despite this annexation the treaty was still taken south and was signed at three sites in the South Island.

The other decision was to move the capital south toAuckland. As I mentioned in class this was prompted by the political necessity of placing the European capital between the two largets concentrations of Maori in the country….Nga Puhi in the north (today still the largest individual Iwi) and the various Waikato Iwi (Waikato, Tainui etc.).

This was at the invitation of Ngati Whatua who conveniently acquired Pakeha who would allow them to trade giving them economic security and ensured their safety from the encroachments of other Iwi.

Wellington settlers saw ££££ and wanted the Capital moved there but this would have legitimised the NZ Co. claims to the lands they claimed.

At first the relationship with Maori was relatively quiet. Various Iwi sought out the Pakeha to sell land, seeking the same advantages that Ngati Whatua had acquired. Crown pre-emption meant land could only be transferred to the Government. Auckland isthmus was sold for about £200 but local Maori were horrified when they saw it auctioned for thousands of pounds. This meant Maori preferred the offers made by settlers not the pittance offered by Government officials.

Reluctance to sell to Hobson or his replacement Shortland, left the Government short of cash. Great Britain expected their colonies to be sefl funding. Shortland and later his replacement Fitzroy found it difficult to finance Government activities, and were forced to issue Government Bonds(Loans) which they were not authorised to do.

In other parts of the Colony the New Zealand Company sites were also struggling as disputes over what their agents had actually purchased limited their expansionist ambitions.

Wellington could not convince Maori to give up the Hutt Valley and quietly fumed at the Maori refusal to give up Waste land.

Whanganui and New Plymouth were also struggling as Maori who had left these areas returned because ironically the presence of Pakeha made the areas safe for them to re-establish Ahi Kaa over these lands.

At Nelson settler became increasingly unhappy about the lack of land. They claimed the nearby Wairau Plains. This was claimed by right of conquest by Ngati Toa.

When Company surveyors had their pegs removed and their Raupo huts destroyed the settler decided to establish the ‘rule of law’ and a Magistrate issued an arrest warrant for Te Rauparaha. I’ve already described the tragically comic events that followed and the utu that saw 17 settlers executed by Te Rangihaeata.

Settlers called Fitzroys decision pusillanimous, we would probably see it as realistic. A traditional approach to the death of so many settlers would normally have seen the might of Britain descend upon the Ngati Toa. Warriors would have died, Pa and Kainga and fields destroyed, and the natural order restored. He didn’t because the warrant was illegal, you can’t be arrested for destroying something that belongs to you.

It was a tacit acknowledegement that outside the areas of settlement,New Zealand remained a Maori country.

Annexation of the Country

That we have a the treaty is generally well known, although I dare say that while everyone in the country is aware of the treaty few are really familiar either with the treaty itself or why one was needed.

It has unfortunately fallen into disrepute, mainly through the machinations of vested interests, both Pakeha and Maori. Some people want the Treaty forgotten, using arguments about its relevance and its necessity.

Most of these people have little understanding of the historical basis for the 1840 decisions, nor do they understand the language used in the treaty which is the foundation of claims and counterclaims made today. Hopefully over the last week you have gained a greater appreciation of the Treaty debate.

For our purposes we are concerned with why a Britain and Maori sought an accommodation. The Treaty required both parties to be willing to take part, however what was offered or expected did not always mesh.

Britain as we discussed in class sought to legitimise their relationship with the Maori. They were concerned over the possible settlement of the country by private companies like the New Zealand Company led by Wakefield. Clashes between Settlers and Maori could be disastrous if there were no military presence.

The "Tory" arrived in Whanganui-a-Tara (Port Nicholson) shortly before Hobson arrived in the Bay of Islands. This coincidence panicked both parties. The Company wanted to acquire as much land as possible before a colony was announced. They hoped to forestall any limitations that might be created should the Government place a moratorium on land sales.

For his part Hobson wanted to legitimise his position and to stop both the Company or anyone else for that matter from infringing on British sovereignty in New Zealand. Thus his apparent haste at writing, translating and negotiating the Treaty at Waitangi.

Besides the Company there were also the possible arrival of the French or Americans. French settlers were rumoured to be headed for Akaroa on Banks peninsula. This may explain his decision to claim the South Island on the basis of discovery (by Cook) rather than by negotiation. It would have taken to long to travel to the South Island. Surprisingly the treaty was still taken south to the Ngai Tahu who signed at three sites.

From our work in class you will be aware of the various points of view expressed at the meeting on the 5^th February. Its seems to have been equally weighted for and against with the matter evenly balanced. Kawiti had argued against it as he distrusted the Missionaries until some important chiefs like Waka Nene spoke in favour of it.

The language of the treaty is extremely important especially in the Maori version. Kawanatanga means governorship, Rangatiratanga means sovereignty.

Consider your textbooks. They belong to the school who has Rangatiratanga over them. You are looking after them, you have Kawanatanga.

Claudia Orange has made the point that the first article should have used the term 'Mana', but Williams who helped translate it knew Chiefs would never have agreed to this.

Maori claims through the 19^th and into the 20^th century against the treaty are all based on the second article which assures Maori of their ownership of their lands, fisheries, taonga etc.

The “fourth article” at Pompalliers prompting assured religious freedom, much to the consternation of the CMS/WMS who had hoped for an extension of the State religion status accorded to the Anglican church in Britain.

Several Missionaries spoke at the meeting. All extolled the virtues and advantages a treaty would bring Maori. As we mentioned in class the idea of a covenant between the Queen and Maori was presented, reinforced by Maori understanding of the Bible where covenants were sacred agreements made between Man and God. Maori (apart from Kawiti) had few reasons to disbelieve or question the motives of the Missionary(s).

The treaty was then copied and sent to the south. However Orange has made the point that other chiefs who signed often did so on the basis that the Hui at Waitangi having already thrashed out the pros and cons of signing and that if Nga Puhi thought it a good idea then they to should sign.

(New 2008) Maori protocols said that a Hui of any standing would thrash out all of the arguments for and against the proposition. A traditional Hui would have continued until everyone had reached agreement. Traders and Missionaries who carried the Treaty around the country may well have exploited this belief, encouraging other chiefs to sign the document.

Britain soon decided that the 500 Maori who signed the treaty represented enough of a sample to announce annexation of the whole country. Again this shows the lack of awareness of the makeup of Maori society and the tribal nature of their culture.