A State Religion?

It seems hard to ignore the irony at Destiny Church storming meeting the Waitangi Marae to demand the Government enforce Christianity as the state religion today. The meeting at Waitangi of course was to support religious diversity. I'm sorry but if Destiny Church acknowledge the Treaty as our founding document then they must either accept the (unwritten) 4th article that established religious freedom OR recognise that religion isn't mentioned in the other 3 articles at all. You could argue that "taonga" might include religion, but in 1840 Christianity was hardly the dominant religion amongst all Maori and since the majority of Pakeha (in Kororareka especially) were hardly the most God fearing of people.

Wellington to Whanganui

Once he had successfully claimed victory and then negotiated a relatively benevolent peace with Heke and Kawiti, Grey sailed southward. Tensions remained high around Wellington with both Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata having moved north to their traditional lands. Their presence tended to dampen the claims of Settlers to areas they coveted – the fertile Hutt being one area. Rangihaeata claimed Ngati Toa had never sold this land and it was off limits to settlers.

Grey had far more muscle than Fitzroy had enjoyed and was prepared to use it. He immediately expelled the occupants of one Pa and prepared to fight. Local Maori became engaged in a short war, with engagements at the Gillespie’s and later at Boulcott’s farm. There was disagreement amongst Ngati Toa about who to support with some opposing the fighting because of the perceived effect on Pakeha trading (Just like Ngapuhi had in the War in the North). This split was worsened when Grey took the pre-emptive step of kidnapping the neutral Te Rauparaha.

Te Rangihaeata moved to Pauatahanui and then when threatened by other Maori (but NOT by advancing British troops) fled northward to the Manawatu.

Te Mamaku who had supported Rangihaeata fled back to the Whanganui and briefly threatened the settlement there. Again local Maori objected to the potential loss of trade and failed to support him.

Thus, ended the very brief, Wellington War. One thing that stands out here is the ruthlessness that Grey displayed in forcing a war with Ngati Toa and in kidnapping and imprisoning Te Rauparaha without ever charging him. (Habeus Corpus anyone?). The other thing that stands out was in the way that Iwi and Hapu could be seduced by the lure of European goods and turn on each other if necessary. The term Kupapa is not generally used, but in 1845-7 Maori were already fighting other Maori in the service of the Queen (although they would say for their own reasons).

Trumpets of War

Heke had been a supporter of the Treaty. Much has been made of the fact that he was the first chief to sign the agreement. I’ve always assumed the figure in the most well known images (see Treaty or Bust below) depict Heke in the act of signing.

Heke it seemed viewed the treaty as an agreement between him and the crown over control over “their” Pakeha. He was disappointed and felt his mana was diminished by decisions made by Hobson. The imposition of custom duties including a 30% tax on muskets reduced their trade. Speculators followed Hobson to Auckland, moving the capital also reduced his mana took away future trading opportunities.

By 1844 he felt aggrieved enough to attack the symbols that on a daily basis reminded him of his loss. Attacking these symbols would show the Administration his anger and show his Iwi that he still needed to be respected

Hekes War was not universally supported within Nga Puhi. We have already talked about how the Iwi were split into competing Hapu The Hokianga hapu had always harboured a lingering jealousy over the riches their bay of Islands relatives monopolised. In 1844 these hapu were prepared to go to war to support Britain.

Belich makes the point that the Maori combatants on both sides in this war were fighting to retain their Pakeha not to drive them away.

The Northern War is characterised by what we might consider to be the low level nature of much of the fighting. Kororarekas sacking seems to have been an accident or over enthusiasm. Later fighting especially between Maori saw prisoners exchanged at the end of each days fighting. When the British were involved it seems to have been more serious. Puketutu seems to have seen Kawiti and Heke testing the Britisn tactics and weapons. Ohaewai saw the unleashing of tactics designed to maximise Maori weapons by weakening British firepower.

The only battle that was lost by Heke was one which did not even include the British. When Imperial troops were involved they characteristically failed to make any impression. Kawitis description of Despard as a ‘very stupid person’ seems particularly apt. Reliance on the 19^th century version of ‘shock and awe’ frontal assaults into prepared positions meant death to troops who were poorly led.

Battles at Puketutu and Ohaewai were effective draws, although a British regiment could never admit as much. They claimed to have inflicted high casualty rates, which the Maori masked by taking their dead and wounded with them. They claimed victories because they occupied Pa sites. Belich notes that these sites were military and economic nullities – empty vessels that had drawn the British into killing fields.

Grey arrived in time for Ruapekapeka, a mixed bag of victories and losses for both sides. Kawiti was unable to spring the trap he had hoped for. Grey had not won a battle nor had he had killed, wounded or captured the ‘rebels’.

The war now drifted to a close. Britain claimed overall victory but surprisingly inflicted now penalties upon the losers. Despite Heke’s best efforts economic wealth would now drift southward and so would the conflict.

The one new innovation of the war was Kawitis development of the Modern pa. No longer the ‘gunfighter’ pa of the Musket Wars, but a new easily constructed (and abandoned) masterpiece of wood and earth that could withstand almost anything the British army could throw at it. These ‘curiously hollowed out’ trench and bunker systems would confound and confuse the British for another 20 years