Sunday 29 April 2007

Treaty or Bust

That we have a the treaty is generally well known, although I dare say that while everyone in the country is aware of the treaty few are really familiar either with the treaty itself or why one was needed.

It has unfortunately fallen into disrepute, mainly through the machinations of vested interests, both Pakeha and Maori. Some people want the Treaty forgotten using arguments about its relevance and its necessity. Most of these people have little understanding of the historical basis for the 1840 decisions, nor do they understand the language used in the treaty which is the foundation of claims and counterclaims made today. Hopefully over the last week you have gained a greater appreciation of the Treaty debate.

For our purposes we are concerned with why a Britain and Maori sought an accommodation. The Treaty required both parties to be willing to take part, however what was offered or expected did not always mesh.

Britain as we discussed in class sought to legitimise their relationship with the Maori. They were concerned over the possible settlement of the country by private companies like the New Zealand Company led by Wakefield. Clashes between Settlers and Maori could be disastrous if there were no military presence.

The Tory arrived in Whanganui-a-Tara (Port Nicholson) shortly before Hobson arrived in the Bay of Islands. This coincidence panicked both parties. The Company wanted to acquire as much land as possible before a colony was announced. They hoped to forestall any limitations that might be created should the Government place a moratorium on land sales.

For his part Hobson wanted to legitimise his position and to stop both the Company or anyone else for that matter from infringing on British sovereignty in New Zealand. Thus his apparent haste at writing, translating and negotiating the Treaty at Waitangi.

Besides the Company there were also the possible arrival of the French or Americans. French settlers were rumoured to be headed for Akaroa on Banks peninsula. This may explain his decision to claim the South Island on the basis of discovery (by Cook) rather than by negotiation. Surprisingly the treaty was still taken south to the Ngai Tahu who signed at three sites.

From our work in class you will be aware of the various points of view expressed at the meeting on the 5th February. Its seems to have been equally weighted for and against with the matter evenly balanced. Kawiti had argued against it as he distrusted the Missionaries until some important chiefs like Waka Nene spoke in favour of it.

The language of the treaty is extremely important especially in the Maori version. Kawanatanga means governorship, Rangatiratanga means sovereignty. Consider your textbooks. They belong to the school who has Rangatiratanga over them. You are looking after them, you have Kawanatanga.

Orange has made the point that the first article should have used the term Mana, but Williams who helped translate it knew Chiefs would never have agreed to this.

Maori claims through the 19th and into the 20th century against the treaty are all based on the second article which assures Maori of their ownership of their lands, fisheries, taonga etc.

The “fourth article” at Pompalliers prompting assured religious freedom, much to the consternation of the CMS/WMS who had hoped for an extension of the State religion status accorded to the Anglican church in Britain.

Several Missionaries spoke at the meeting. All extolled the virtues and advantages a treaty would bring Maori. As we mentioned in class the idea of a covenant between the Queen and Maori was presented, reinforced by Maori understanding of the Bible where covenants were sacred agreements made between Man and God. Maori (apart from Kawiti) had few reasons to disbelieve or question the motives of the Missionary(s).

The treaty was then copied and sent to the south. However Orange has made the point that other chiefs who signed often did so on the basis that the Hui at Waitangi having already thrashed out the pros and cons of signing and that if Nga Puhi thought it a good idea then they to should sign.

Britain soon decided that the 500 Maori who signed the treaty represented enough of a sample to announce annexation of the whole country. Again this shows the lack of awareness of the makeup of Maori society and the tribal nature of their culture.

Hobson, Stephen and Wakefield

Towards the end of the 1830’s several things came to a head to force Britain into New Zealand. As late as 1838 after Hobson’s reported that GB would be best served by establishing the Indian style factories. The settlements would be British but their hinterland would be Maori. This of course presupposed that British interest in New Zealand lay only in exploitation of its resources by traders…

In 1839 the Colonial Office was prepared to send Hobson back to negotiate such a plan, and then in the space of only a few months this became a decision to annexe the whole country – albeit with the agreement of as many chiefs as possible.

Missionary pressure had originally been against any increase in British presence so that they could complete their ‘civilise and convert’ mission. However this changed in the late 1830’s and they became more inclined toward a treaty of some sort. This may have been because of the French and the imminent arrival of settlers.

Bishop Pompalliers arrival was alarming for the CMS/WMS. They had had the country to themselves and were happily converting Maori to the Anglican religion. Pompallier threatened them in two ways, he was French and he was Catholic. Its debateable which of these two evils they feared the most. But fear them they did. The missionaries expected Britain to be the dominant presence in New Zealand, any chance that it might become French and thus Catholic was unacceptable. Their monopoly on Native souls was threatened and they did not want them tainted by Papist heresy. New Zealand as a British colony would ensure their legitimacy and their dominance. They were able to feed off the anti-French sentiments in Busby’s communications to the Government.

In their own way they could influence the Government. Stephen at the Colonial Office has been described as the most powerful man in the British Empire. The Office oversaw the running of the entire Empire from Australia, India, the Caribbean and North Africa. Nothing happened anywhere without their knowledge, and if the Government needed to know anything they asked Stephen.

Stephen for his part was an Evangelical Christian. He was also an important member of the CMS. Communications from the missions in New Zealand inevitably found their way across his desk.

Interest in New Zealand as a possible site for settlement had existed for some time. Many people saw this a way of making money and so there was great interest in exploiting the situation. There were several iterations of the New Zealand Association/Company. The first sent settlers in 1825 but this attempt failed and the Company also failed.

In Britain in the 1830’s settlement again raised its head. It was best represented by the Company set up by Edward Gibbon Wakefield. We have covered his early career in class and there will be a handout covering him in more detail, later.

Many of the people involved in his scheme were also involved in the Government, including several members of Parliament. As 1838 moved into 1839 the Company and the Government eyed each other warily. The Company feared the intrusion of the Government into their affairs, especially the supply of cheap land their scheme relied upon.

For their part the Government were worried that an unfettered influx of settlers would result in disputes with the Maori that would inevitably require an armed intervention by the Government. Humanitarian sentiments meant that they could not allow this to happen.

When Hobson arrived in Port Jackson his expected status had changed from Britain’s Consul to New Zealand to Lieutenant Governor of the Colony.

A foot in the Door

In 1831 Yate persuaded several northern chiefs to sign the “Letter to King William.” This petition sought British protection from the French. It seemed that the good Mister Yate used the arrival of the French ship ‘la Favourite’ to stir up the Chiefs into believing that France was about to annexe New Zealand and would take the opportunity to take revenge for the murder of Marion du Fresne some 70 years earlier… as it turns out the French ship was simply continuing their tradition of scientific research and left without doing much at all.


What is interesting is that by recognising the letter Britain gave some semblance of recognition of the country itself. Combined with the terrible events surrounding the Elizabeth affair it was enough to encourage the Colonial office under Stephen to look at some way of controlling the behaviour of British citizens in the islands.


Sending a Resident would help to alleviate the situation. Instructions sent to the Governor in Sydney were relayed with the expectation that he would provide a suitable candidate. By all accounts James Busby was an irritating twit. He seems to have continually sought higher office within the administration of the Governor and did not seem to realise how annoying he was. The new position of resident allowed the Governor to fulfil the Colonial office instructions and to rid himself of a pest at the same time. Unfortunately he disliked Busby so much he refused to provide him with all of the things necessary for the job. A ship, troops were denied him, he even had to plead for the house he needed to live in. The problem of course was that while Port Nicholson had to provide the Resident they were unwilling to pay for him – there were no taxes to be collected in New Zealand.


A Resident is just about the lowest position available in Diplomatic circles. It ranks below Consul and Ambassador. A resident has few powers and would not normally do more than represent his countries views to his hosts. By appointing Busby however this appears to be a tacit recognition of New Zealand as a sovereign nation.


Busby was expected to do little except keep the peace. Without any formal backup he failed miserably. Thus, the unkind name given to him of “Man’o’war without guns’. He was left in the position of writing letters to anyone who would listen. But he was not entirely witless and recognised the need for an ensign that would allow New Zealand built ships to be registered and allowed to trade with Sydney without being confiscated.


The Flag chosen in 1834 was negotiated by Busby and a number of Northern Chiefs. Its design was one of three presented to them. When it was gazetted by the Admiralty it again reinforcedthe view of New Zealand as an independent state.


The following year Busby again exceeded his authority and negotiated with 35 Northern chiefs and created the Declaration of Independence. This was also sent to Great Britain and again it was recognised by the Government.
In the meantime Baron De Theirry had arrived in the North causing a mild panic amongst some, apart from Busby who sent off a number of wild letters to the Governor and the Colonial office concerning an imminent takeover by the ‘King’ of New Zealand. Luckily for Busby the Nga Puhi of the Hokianga were less than impressed with the Frenchman’s claims to 40,000 acres (sold to him in 1820 by Hika) and allowed him only a few hundred. His French settler promptly rioted and left. Poor old De Theirry ended his days as a piano teacher in Auckland.


There was also growing French interest in Akaroa and Busby continued to bombard the Colonial Office with letters of annexation in the south. Not only were the French a colonial threat but the large numbers of American whalers and the appointment of an American Consul (Clendon) was also a matter of concern.

Thursday 5 April 2007

Thank You

Well Its the end of the term. I want to thank Geoff and Carole, our trainee teachers. Its been a tough introduction to NZ history for both of them. Geoff didn't have much NZ history in his degree and of course coming from Grand Rapids, Carole didn't have any. The hard part of course is learning all the information that's required for even for a small part of the coursework. Both of them have done a load of reading and preparation for the classes they taught and both did a great job. Its been a good opportunity for me to review what we've been doing and thinking about how we can improve the learning process. I was pleased with what they did in class and how you guys let them take control. Thanks to them and to you as well. Carole will be back briefly at the start of next term. Have a good holiday, enjoy Easter. See you next term.

Tuesday 3 April 2007

Potatoes Muskets and Revenge

It seems such a pity that this time period is almost ignored or downplayed in many of our older history’s. As you will have found reading through the Handout it was a period of real drama, tragedy, ruthlessness and heroism. The timeline doesn’t really do this event justice – I blamed the lack of space but also a full chronology would have been unnecessarily complex and confusing for our purposes.


First lets look at traditional Maori warfare. It usually meant fighting between closely related Hapu. These Hapu sometimes joined together to fight as an Iwi against their wider relations that bordered their lands. Rarely did they venture beyond this, although they might in order to support their (related) neighbours against other (unrelated) Iwi. Apart form anything else they could not carry enough food to sustain a long campaign.(it makes better sense on the whiteboard). The musket and the potato changed this, allowing taua like te Amiowhenua in 1819 and 1822 to be away for months.

The wars have also been called the ‘Potato’ wars based on the idea that it was the growing of the humble spud which allowed Maori to supply large enough quantities to trade for the Musket.

It could be called the UTU wars. Hongi sought revenge for “The Feast of Seagulls’ at Moremonui (1808) and the capture and sale of his kinswomen by the Venus in 1806. It seems that his fostering of relations with the Missionaries and trip to England was fuelled by the desire to acquire some of the “thousand, thousand muskets’ kept in the Tower (of London).

It also meant that when the gifts he received fell short of what he needed he was happy to sell Baron de Theirry 40,000 acres of land at the Hokianga. (Hongi of course came from the Bay of Islands). Accounts of what he did with the suit of armour vary from one story to the next, but he did keep part of it which helped him in at least one encounter but did not stop a musket ball from eventually killing him after fighting with his kin in 1818.

Together with Te Morenga he fell upon the Whanau-a-Apanui and Ngati Porou for the killing and eating of their kin. He claimed to have laid waste to 500 kainga and pa in the 12 months he was away. Hongi waited 17 years to seek final vengeance against the Ngati Whatua driving the remnants into the Waikato. This was to allay the deaths of his brothers and sister – especially in the way she died. (the yucky uterus story!)

Even the Waikato waited 30 years to inflict utu on the Ngati Toa when they forced them to flee from Kawhia. Later Ngapuhi rampages were possibly to keep the Iwi he had decimated from regrouping and attacking him in turn. It also allowed Hongi to capture more slaves for his gardens and ovens. It didn’t do any harm to his reputation or mana either. Defeats in the mid-1820’s seem to prove that once armed with muskets other Iwi could adequately defend themselves against the Ngapuhi.

Te Rauparaha’s rampage against the Nagi Tahu appears to have been as much a grab for the riches of Pounamu, but it was also in revenge for the death of a Ngati Toa chief at Kaiapoi . His capture of a Ngai Tahu chief who was subsequently tortured and killed (including the drinking of blood and eating of eyes). The use of the Elizabeth would of course add to British worries about New Zealand.

It also becomes complex when you try to figure out who fought who for what reasons. Complexity can be seen in the fact that despite harbouring a need for utu Hongi allowed Ngati Whatua to join the Amiowhenua expedition only to turn on them later when it suited him (Revenge a dish best served cold?).

We need to consider to the effects of the musket, most Historians seem to agree that the Musket did not increase the Maori propensity for war, it just made the effects worse. The potato allowed Maori to trade for guns, as well as giving them a more reliable and transportable food supply – carried on the backs of slaves who themselves were a source of food.

Tribes that lacked guns suffered horrendous losses. The massacre of Arawa at Mokoia island is just one example. Thousands of slaves were taken and used in the production of even more potatoes (and moko mokai) for trade. Tribes were reduced in number, eradicated or displaced. Large areas of the country were depopulated or left wastelands.

Iwi like the Ngati Whatua were forced to live with their Waikato kin while they waited ‘for the coast to clear.’ Others like the Ngati Toa abandoned their lands altogether to move to Kapiti, attacking many Iwi along the way.

As each tribe suffered attacks and loss they then began to seek Europeans, either Missionaries or Traders who could supply guns. They changed their lifestyle and economy to acquire the one thing that could protect them. The ripple effect moved from north to south, mainly from Ngapuhi down. Ngai Tahu in the deep south had whalers/sealers who supplied them with guns, which severely weakened northern Ngai Tahu and left them vulnerable to the Ngati Toa.

Other tribes went offshore to use their muskets. Ngati Mutunga attacks on the Chathams and the enslavement and destruction of their culture is hard to fathom or explain, especially from today’s perspective. Perhaps warriors who fought so readily simply despised a people who would not resist them. Utu would not explain this event.